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Abstract
Subsidised employment is one tool of active labour market policies to improve the chances of the
unemployed to find permanent employment. Using informative individual data coming from
various administrative sources we investigate the effects of two different schemes of subsidised
temporary employment implemented in Switzerland. One scheme operates as a non-profit em-
ployment programme (EP), whereas the other is a subsidy for temporary jobs (TEMP) in firms
operating in competitive markets. Using econometric matching methods we find that TEMP is
considerably more successful in getting the unemployed back into work than TEMP. We also
find that compared to nonparticipation both programmes are unsuccessful for unemployed that
find job easily anyway as well for those with short unemployment duration. For unemployed with
potentially long unemployment duration and for actual long term unemployed, both programmes
may have some positive effect, but the effect of TEMP is much larger.
Keywords
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market policies, matching on the propensity score, Switzerland
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1 Introduction
Subsidised employment is an important tool of labour market policy in many (all?) developed
countries. It exists not only in countries using the ’European’ type of a more interventionist ap-
proach to labour market policy (like France, Germany Sweden, ...), but it is also used by coun-
tries firmly based on the Anglo-Saxon model of the labour market, like the USA (Earned Income
Tax Credit, EITC), Great Britain (as part of the new deal), and Canada (the Targeted Wage Sub-
sidies and the Self-sufficiency Project).
Although widely used, there are considerable differences in the design of the subsidy schemes.
The most common form is a wage subsidy paid either to the employer or the employee. The sub-
sidy itself my be permanent (conditional on low earnings like the EITC), or it may have a maxi-
mum eligibility period. The programmes may subsidise strictly temporary employment or just
decrease the initial wage of a job that is supposed to become a permanent one. Furthermore,
within the temporary subsidy schemes, there is a difference whether a ’real’ job in a firm acting on
competitive markets is subsidised, or whether the subsidised job is located in some specialised
non-profit operation active in some sheltered part of the economy which does not compete with
private firms. The latter are the typical European ’employment programmes’. Finally, there is the
issue of the actual direct cost of programme participation to individuals, the unemployment in-
surance system, and society as whole.
The different programmes may influence the allocation in the labour market in different ways.
While in operation they offer temporary employment that otherwise would not be accepted by the
unemployed or created by firms because there are no incentives to do so. These negative incen-
tives may be due to unemployment or welfare benefits or minimum wages, respectively. But are
the different schemes of temporary subsidised employment successful in reintegrating the unem-
ployed into work faster? Do they differ? What can we learn from these differences?
As far as we know few theoretical research and no comparative empirical research has been de-
voted to analyse the different effects of different types of employment subsidies on those who
receive the subsidy. Cross-country studies face the substantial problem of comparing two pro-
grammes under potentially very different labour market conditions. Therefore, it would useful to
’partial out’ the effect of local labour market conditions by comparing two different programmes4
within the same country. This approach trivially requires that a country really runs two different
types of subsidy programmes accessible to the same group of people. Furthermore, a large and
informative data base is necessary to address the selection issues that pop up in every evaluation
study. This is a particularly demanding task when one concentrates on the more subtle differences
between two programmes that may be only small parts of the diverse active labour market policy
a particular country runs.
In fact Switzerland can be used to study the differences between two version of employment sub-
sidies that are both operated on a larger scale and both targeted at more or less the same popula-
tion of unemployed. Both programmes use temporary employment to increase the reemployment
chances of their participants. The crucial difference is that one programme operates as a non-
profit employment programme, whereas the other is a subsidy of temporary jobs in firms operat-
ing in a competitive environment. Furthermore, in the Swiss case a large individual data base
(coming from various administrative registers) is available that has previously been used for a
microeconometric evaluation study of several active labour market policies by Gerfin and
Lechner (2000, GL).
1 GL argue that the data is informative enough to control for selection issues.
Furthermore, it contains several thousands participants in both programmes.
Although not of primary interest in their study, GL already note a substantial difference between
the effects of the two types of temporary employment subsidies. Recent evaluations of the
Swedish active labour market policies, for example, also draw the general conclusion that pro-
grammes most closely attached to a ’real’ job in a competitive environment dominate the other
programmes (Carling and Richardson, 2001, and Sianesi, 2001). However, the two studies about
Sweden are based on programmes that do not allow to really isolate the difference whether an
temporary employment subsidy is allocated to the competitive sector or to the non-competitive
sector.
2 At the moment there seems to be no literature on econometric comparisons of two pro-
grammes of subsidised temporary employment, probably for the reason that most countries run
only one type of those schemes.
                                                          
1  In fact the data used by GL is updated. It contains additional variables and it covers a longer period of time.
2  The study by Carling and Richardson (2001) focuses basically on training programmes that are either located in
some class room or at a real firm (with some duties of real job being part of the training). The study by Sianesi
(2001) compares two programmes, one of which is a subsidy for a temporary job, the other one being a
programme that is a subsidy for a job supposed to become permanent. However, the latter one is of course prone
to have very substantial direct crowding out effects with respect to unsubsidised employment. Those are probably
much larger than those for subsidising only temporary jobs.5
There are several important questions regarding the previous results by GL that we also try to
answer in this paper: Are the results robust with respect to other outcome variables, especially
earnings? Are the results robust in the long run? If so, why are subsidised temporary jobs supe-
rior to employment programmes? Does this average results hold for all groups of the unem-
ployed, or are there systematic differences?
In this paper we carefully analyse the institutional settings in which both programmes operate.
We relate the institutions to some theoretical thoughts about plausible differentiated effects of the
programmes assuming that their effects might be due to three different potential channels, namely
the addition of human capital, signalling, or stigma effects.
Our empirical findings strongly confirm the strong positive effects of the subsidy for temporary
jobs in firms operating in competitive markets (TEMP) as compared to the employment pro-
gramme (EP) type of the subsidy. We can also dismiss the concern that the positive effects are to
due the participants of TEMP taking up inferior, i.e. lower paying jobs. Furthermore, we find that
both programmes are much more effective in raising reemployment probabilities for the unem-
ployed having great difficulties in the labour market. However, even for the ’better risks’ TEMP
seem to have some, albeit small positive effects. It appears that TEMP as well as EP are adding
some human capital, although with different effectiveness. However, we cannot rule out that sig-
nalling and stigma effects might play important roles in explaining our results as well.
The next section describes the Swiss programmes in some depth. Section 3 rather informally de-
velops our theoretical insights on why these different types of programmes may have different
effects. Section 4 as well as Appendix A describe the data and present some descriptive results.
Section 5 analyses the expected and observed differences between the participants in both wage
subsidy programmes. Section 6 gives a summary of the econometrics used, which is multiple
treatment evaluation framework using a ’matching on the propensity score estimator’. Section 7
presents the results and Section 8 concludes. Appendix B contains the results of the estimation of
the propensity scores in multinomial probit framework. Appendix C describes the extent of the
common support problem and our remedies. Appendix D adds additional results concerning the
subgroup heterogeneity of the effects of the programmes.6
2  Subsidised employment as part of active labour market policies:
the Swiss case
As already noted subsidised employment can take many forms. Switzerland uses two different
types of subsidises to foster reintegration of the unemployment into the labour market. Therefore
to understand the effects and the composition of the group of participants in these programmes it
is necessary to first get an understanding of the institutional environment in which these pro-
grammes operate. Then we describe the two programmes.
Swiss unemployment insurance
The basic rules of Swiss unemployment insurance (UI) are as follows: Benefit entitlement lasts
for a maximum of two years (conditional on employment history). The entitlement period is split
in two parts: the first 30 weeks are unconditional on programme participation, but the remaining
entitlement is in principle conditional on some participation. The benefit level in the two periods
is the same. However, in practice these rules are not strictly enforced: It is not unusual to
participate in a programme in the first 30 weeks of the unemployment spell. More frequently,
unemployed receive the benefits in the conditional period without any participation in ALMP,
because no programme is offered. The entitlement is conditional on a previous contribution to the
unemployment insurance for at least 6 months within the past two years. After the two year
entitlement period expires, receiving a new entitlement period is conditional on being employed
for at least 12 months within three years after the end of the previous unemployment spell. The
replacement ratio is between 70% and 80% of the insured earnings, depending on socio-demo-
graphic characteristics. The maximum monthly benefit is about CHF 7000.
Switzerland runs a substantial and diverse active labour market policy.
3 The active labour market
programmes (ALMP) in Switzerland can be grouped into three categories: a) training, b) em-
ployment programmes, and c) subsidised temporary jobs. Training consists of a wide variety of
courses, ranging from basic courses to specific work-related training. The main differences
between b) and c) are that employment programmes take place outside the “regular” labour mar-
ket (see below) and are subsidised to a larger extent. By contrast a subsidised temporary job must
be in a regular for-profit firm.
                                                          
3  More details can be found in Gerfin and Lechner (2000) and in Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller (2000).7
The cantons are obliged by law to fill a minimum of places in labour market programmes per
year. Until January 2000 this minimum was 25’000 places distributed across cantons according to
their unemployment rates. By comparison, there were about 190’000 registered job-seekers in
1997 and 140’000 in 1998. An important feature of subsidised temporary jobs is that they are
(probably for historical reasons) not part of the official ALMP. Thus, they are not counted to-
wards the minimum of places to be filled per canton in the various programmes of the ALMP.
Employment Programmes (EP)
Employment programmes are offered by both public and private institutions and usually last for
six months.
4 There are two different types of programmes: either it is a single position, i.e. a
special job in a public (e.g. administration or hospitals) or private institution (e.g. restaurants), or
it is a collective programme. Collective programmes are carried out by specialised non-profit
organisations. The jobs should be as similar as possible to regular employment, but they should
be extraordinary, i.e. the organisers of employment programmes should not be in competition
with other firms. However, in practice some organising firms may operate on the same market as
other private firms with comparable products (e.g. in the repair and restoration sector). Collective
employment programmes are regulated by the cantonal unemployment offices in consultation
with the employer and the employee organisations.
5 In conclusion, employment programmes can
be seen as fully subsidised labour in a non-profit organisation. In most cases the subsidy even
exceeds 100 %, because some of the costs of capital, overhead costs, and so on may be reim-
bursed as well.
Unemployed are placed in employment programmes by the labour office. Given the placement
decision participation is compulsory. Sometimes, informal interviews we conducted at the
placement offices strongly suggest that in a considerable number of cases case workers use em-
ployment programme as a test for the willingness to work. While participating in an EP the un-
employed has to continue job search and must accept any suitable job offer (a job would not be
considered suitable if it pays less than current unemployment benefits, the working conditions are
unacceptable, or if the workplace is too far away from home). Formally, the organiser of the em-
ployment programme acts as the employer and the participant as an employee (but the organiser
                                                          
4  There is no substantive difference between the type of ’jobs’ offered by the two different groups of providers of
these programmes.8
cannot “hire” the employees, they are selected by the placement office). Duration of the pro-
gramme (usually 6 months), the wage and the social security contributions are regulated in a
temporary work contract between the organiser and the worker. In particular, the organiser has to
send a monthly payroll account to both the employee and the placement office. The latter pays
the participant directly. The wage has to be at least the minimum wage set for the region and
sector (if there is a collective wage agreement). It may be larger than unemployment benefits, but
in practice this appears to be rather an exception. For the placement office there are no direct
savings associated with placing an unemployed into an employment programme. In 1998,
roughly 17'000 persons participated in an employment programme (about 10% of the registered
job seekers).
It is worthwhile noting that the rule and the design of the Swiss employment programmes closely
follow the rules of the German employment programmes. Similar programmes are also operated
in a couple of other European countries. As in the Swiss case these types of programmes – if used
at all – are usually an important part of the active labour market policy of that specific country.
Subsidised Temporary jobs (TEMP)
The immediate objective of the programmes that we call subsidised temporary jobs is to encour-
age job seekers to accept job offers for “unsuitable” jobs (see above) that pay less than their un-
employment benefits (scaled up by the replacement ratio) by compensating the difference with
additional payments from the UI system. The income generated by this scheme is larger than
unemployment benefits in case of not accepting the temporary job.
6 Thus this programme is
financially attractive for both the unemployed and the placement office. If the accumulated
duration of temporary jobs within the entitlement period exceeds 12 months the unemployed be-
comes eligible for another 2-year entitlement period. However, insured earnings are related to the
wage earned in the temporary job which is below 80% of previous insured earnings (thus com-
bining many such spells would lead to a consistent drop in income). Mean duration of these tem-
porary jobs is roughly 4 months, but there is considerable variation.
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5  This so-called “three party commission” has the authority to decide whether an employment programme should be
considered to be in competition with the private sector. It acts upon complaints by the private sector.
6  The compensation payment is the replacement ratio applied to the difference between the earnings in the
temporary job and the previous earnings which will always be larger than the difference between the
unemployment benefit and the earnings in the temporary job. At the same time the unemployment insurance
system 'saves money' by always paying less than the regular unemployment benefits.9
Although TEMP is not part of the ALMP, it is its single largest programme. In 1998 roughly 20%
of the unemployed participated at some point in TEMP. Bauer, Baumann, and Künzi (1999) re-
port that only about 20% of the jobs in TEMP are arranged by the placement office. Employer and
employee have a regular temporary work contract defining the conditions of the job (mainly
duration of the contract, wage and contributions to future pensions). The wage cannot be below
the minimum wage set for the region, sector and occupation (if there is a collective wage agree-
ment). Given that the wage has to be less than 80% of previous earnings (the unemployment
benefit) to be eligible for a subsidised temporary job it is obvious that many jobs in TEMP are
below the qualification level of the unemployed.
The OECD (1996) states that TEMP can be a powerful instrument to bring unemployed back to
employment. However, there is concern that it may lead to distortions in the labour market if it is
not tightly monitored. For example, workers might be laid-off and recalled in the TEMP scheme.
Furthermore, firms might use TEMP to avoid the dismissal protection rules in order to have a
more flexible work force, or TEMP might be used to avoid the wage levels set in collective wage
bargaining agreements. However, at the moment there appears to be no evidence of abuse of
TEMP in these respects.
Arrangements like TEMP subsidising jobs (i) within firms competing in the market and (ii) that
are explicitly intended not to become permanent employment are not commonly used in active
labour market policies. One programme that is similar to TEMP is the Targeted Wage Subsidies
scheme introduced 1996 in Canada. It is an employer based subsidy. A maximum of 60% of the
wage is paid up to 78 weeks. Similar to the Swiss case the main goal of this programme is to of-
fer work experience, not necessarily continuing employment, to the unemployed.
It is important to recognise that the main difference between TEMP and EP are the kind of job
and the work experience they generate. Ignoring any potential market distortions and assuming
that EP do not produce public goods to a considerable extent, then from the point of view of the
tax payer EP are more expensive than subsidised temporary jobs. An interesting question we look
at with our data in Sections 4 and 5 is whether these programmes are systematically used by case
workers in the labour office for different groups of people (case workers fully control access to
EP, but only approve of participation in TEMP).10
3 Why and for whom should these programmes work?
The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question if, and if so why the subsidised tempo-
rary job programme is found to be superior to the employment programme. As described in Sec-
tion 2 these two programmes can be seen as different implementations of temporary subsidised
employment, both with the clear intention to improve the chances to find (other) permanent em-
ployment. To the best of our knowledge there is no other paper that addresses the question why
two such different programmes may have different effects. In the following we sketch some hy-
potheses by borrowing from the literature on wage subsidies, human capital accumulation and
signalling.
There is a large literature on the effects of wage subsidies (e.g. Katz, 1996). However, in the pre-
sent context the standard theory of wage subsidies is not applicable. It is important to recognise
that the Swiss subsidised employment  programme is for temporary jobs only, intended as step-
ping stones to permanent employment. Individuals in the subsidised temporary employment pro-
gramme are still unemployed in the sense of receiving unemployment benefits (in the form of the
compensation payment) and of being registered as job seekers. Only after leaving unemployment
into non-subsidised employment they are considered as being employed. This is completely dif-
ferent compared to the standard wage subsidy case which is based on a static model and only
considers permanent jobs. A dynamic extension of the static model of wage subsidies recently
described in Bell, Blundell, and van Reenen (1999) shows that the only way that a temporary
subsidy can have a permanent effect on the employability of low-skilled unemployed is to raise
their productivity through work experience due to the programme. Two main points arise from
their model.
7 First, it implies a long-run effect of a short-run subsidy. By getting some low skilled
workers into temporary jobs their productivity is raised and so their chance of moving out of un-
employment is enhanced. Second, the model raises the question why the unemployed do not take
up (temporary) jobs as an ‘investment’ because of these long term gains. The answer could be
that there are constraints that prevent some unemployed from finding temporary jobs.
                                                          
7  In a simplified version of this model there are two periods, three sectors and two types of workers, type I (high
productivity) and type II (low productivity). A worker increases his or her probability of acquiring a real increase
in productivity with tenure (e.g. learning by doing). Variation in the individual’s reservation wage generates lower
probabilities of the less productive workers being in employment at any given time. After a period in employment
type II workers look identical to skilled worker with probability, p (see Bell et al., 1999, who also only present a
verbal description of the model).11
In our case the problem is extended to two types of temporary employment, one found to be suc-
cessful (TEMP) in Gerfin and Lechner (2000), the other unsuccessful (EP). Our question is thus:
why would employment programmes and subsidised temporary jobs have different effects on
employment chances? One possibility is that they both have an effect on productivity, but gener-
ate different human capital. Given the institutional differences it is possible that employment
programmes generate human capital that is less valued by potential employers due to the re-
quirement that these jobs have to be “extraordinary” and not in competition with “real” jobs.
Consequently, these jobs are concentrated in non-competitive sheltered sectors in which there are
too few vacancies to absorb the programme participants. By contrast, temporary jobs are concen-
trated in competitive sectors which have thus stronger labour demand, so the sector-specific hu-
man capital generated by the temporary job is valuable for finding a permanent job in the same
sector.
An argument against the human capital explanation is the fact that the subsidised temporary jobs
are often below the qualification of the unemployed (they usually pay less than unemployment
benefits which are only 80% of previous earnings). It is uncertain whether a couple of weeks in a
job for which the unemployed is overqualified really enhances his human capital. Furthermore, it
might be difficult for a potential employer to observe the human capital effect, given that the pool
of possible employees consists of unemployed, many of them long-term unemployed. However,
it is possible that the programme an unemployed participated in carries a signal to employers.
Suppose a potential employer has to choose between two job applicants with similar characteris-
tics, one coming from an employment programme (A), the other coming from the subsidised
temporary job (B). Applicant B, however, looks like he is coming from a temporary “real” job.
The employer may use this information to conclude that applicant B is better in the sense of
having a closer attachment to the labour market. This effect will be especially strong when the
potential permanent job is in the same sector as the subsidised temporary job.
Another possible explanation is the occurrence of stigma effects and the related concept of statis-
tical discrimination. Suppose employment programmes are stigmatised in the sense that there is
common belief among employers that participants in employment programmes are on average
less productive then their counterparts in subsidised temporary jobs. Hence in a hiring situation
they will always choose the participant in subsidised temporary jobs, even if he is not more pro-
ductive, other factors observable to the employer being equal. If the unemployed know this, the12
more productive unemployed self-select themselves into the temporary employment programme,
turning the stigma effect into a self-fulfilling expectation. There is some (anecdotal) evidence that
employment programmes indeed carry the described stigma. The question then is why not all
unemployed try to get a subsidised temporary job. The answer is that there is a limited supply of
suitable temporary jobs and, in general, they are not arranged by the placement office. Hence, it
is costly to find these jobs.
The literature on signalling and screening effects does not directly address the problem at hand.
Two somewhat related papers are Ma and Weiss (1993) and McCormick (1990). Ma and Weiss
(1993) show that it may be better to become unemployed than to take up a low-skill job in case of
job loss. Taking up a low-skill (“lousy”) job may be seen as a bad signal by future employers. A
similar argument is made in McCormick (1990). The basic story is that workers possess private
information about their abilities which is correlated with employers’ evaluations. There is a po-
tential gain to employers from using this information to select among job applicants who are ob-
servationally equivalent. Therefore, workers with favourable private information want to signal
this to employers. In McCormick’s model there is a separating equilibrium in which, after learn-
ing about their layoff in the next period, the most productive workers remain employed (by
searching on-the-job), the medium productive workers experience an unemployment spell, and
the least productive workers experience a longer spell between skilled jobs, spending this time in
unskilled work.
The human capital and the signalling hypotheses are not exclusive. Of course, it is possible that
the subsidised temporary job at the same time enhances productivity and embodies the positive
signal. Hence, it is not possible to derive strict tests of the hypotheses. Nevertheless, we can think
of hypotheses about effect heterogeneity for different groups of unemployed that are plausible
under some explanations and that not plausible under others. Examining the empirical evidence
for these hypothesis may indicate some answers to the question why programmes have different
effects.
We assume for the sake of the following arguments that if human capital is generated by one of
the programmes it is by replacing already lost or preserving human capital due to ongoing unem-
ployment. In addition, we assume that the benefit of preserving human capital (i.e. the participa-
tion in the programme should at least prevent a further depreciation of human capital due to un-13
employment) is balanced by the lock-in effect.
8 Consider the expected effects of employment
programmes and subsidised temporary employment compared to nonparticipation for unem-
ployed with a short unemployment spell. For those, we would expect the human capital effects of
the programme to be negligible.
9 Hence if a programme has any effect with respect to nonpartici-
pation it must be primarily due to a signal. This is a case where the models of McCormick (1990)
and Ma and Weiss (1993) are most appropriate in our setting. On the other hand, for the long
term unemployed we would expect human capital effects. Under the assumption that the signal-
ling effect is constant, a test for human capital effects would be whether the effects for the long
term unemployed are stronger than for the short-term unemployed.
Now consider effect heterogeneity with respect to the level of previous earnings. For unemployed
with relatively high previous earnings (and productivity), the interesting comparison is with non-
participation. This is another case where the models of McCormick (1990) and Ma and Weiss
(1993) are directly applicable. Since most subsidised temporary jobs and temporary employment
are low pay jobs, unemployed with high previous earnings are overqualified to perform these
jobs. In this case the theoretical models imply that it is optimal not to take such a job. It may even
bad for them to enter a programme due to the negative effects predicted by the theoretical signal-
ling models described above. Hence we should find no positive effect with respect to nonpartici-
pation, and even negative effects when signalling is important. For those with relatively low
earnings (and presumably productivity), on the other hand, the human capital and the signalling
effect are not separable. So if we find significant effects for a programme we attribute these to
either human capital or to signalling.
A similar argument applies to qualification measured by the case worker’s evaluation of the
chances to find a job. The main difference is that previous earnings are known to potential em-
ployers while the case worker’s evaluation are not. So possibly the comparison between the ef-
fects for the subgroups defined by these two indicators for qualification may help to separate hu-
man capital from signalling effects.
                                                          
8  Programmes can actually harm individual employment chances. Even if the programmes themselves do not
change the employment chances directly, an immediate indirect effect of all programmes could be a reduction in
job search activities compared to nonparticipants. Furthermore, participants may receive fewer job offers from the
labour office.
9 It is well known from the research on duration dependence and hysteresis that one effect of ongoing
unemployment is an increasing depreciation of human capital.14
To understand which group of unemployed should be expected in which programme, it is in-
structive to compare the different incentive structures generated by the two programmes for the
direct actors, namely the unemployed as well as the case worker in the local placement office.
From the point of view of the latter it is obvious that subsidised temporary jobs are attractive. The
direct costs are lower and they do not require assignment efforts as they are usually proposed by
the unemployed. The case workers basic strategy appears to be to wait and see whether the un-
employed finds a regular job quickly. If the unemployed finds neither a regular nor a subsidised
temporary job the case worker tries to find a suitable programme. Again, our informal interviews
suggest that the which unemployed are sent to employment programmes when nothing else
seems to be appropriate. As already mentioned, sometimes employment programmes are also
used as a test for the willingness to work. This behaviour is of course indicative of the rather bad
reputation the employment programmes may have with potential employers. Another reason to
send unemployed to employment programmes is the requirement that each canton has to fulfil its
quota of programme places (c.f. Section 2).
For the unemployed the situation is more complicated. The above considerations suggest the fol-
lowing pattern: at the beginning of the unemployment spell it is not optimal to do low skill jobs
while looking for an adequate job, especially for better qualified unemployed. In addition, an
indirect effect of participating in a programme could be a reduction in job search activities and
job offers from the placement office compared to nonparticipants. The unemployed with good
chance to find a job will want to avoid this. After some time in unemployment, however, it can
become optimal to search for a temporary job. However, the fact that the majority of subsidised
temporary jobs is arranged by the unemployed herself suggests that a search effort is needed to
get into this programme. This in turn implies that it is costly for the unemployed to find these
programmes. Both human capital and the signalling explanations of the effects imply that this
cost is only taken when the expected return is higher.
How will these considerations affect the composition of the participants in both programmes? In
fact, it seems that nobody has an incentive to get into an employment programme (except case
workers in order to fulfil their quota, which is hardly a good incentive). The described strategy of
the case workers suggests that participants in employment programmes have a relatively long
unemployment duration when they enter the programme. Unemployed with sanctions regarding
their benefit may also end up in employment programmes, given that these are sometimes used as15
a test for the willingness to work. Furthermore, we would expect the unemployed with low skills
and low chances to find a job to be overrepresented in the employment programme because it is
difficult for them to find subsidised temporary jobs.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data base
Our empirical analysis is based on two matched sources of administrative data that have already
been used by Gerfin and Lechner (2000). The first source is the information system for placement
and labour market statistics (AVAM) and the unemployment offices payment systems (ASAL).
We have data from January 1996 to December 1999 for all persons who were registered as un-
employed on December 31, 1997. These data provide detailed information about the unemploy-
ment history, ALMP participation and personal characteristics. For a random subsample of these
data of about 30’000 observations we have data from the social security records for the period
1988-1999. The merged sample contains information on the individual labour market histories
and earnings on a monthly basis for 10 years prior to the current unemployment spell. In addition
we have detailed information concerning several aspects: socio-demographics (age, gender, mari-
tal status, native language, nationality, type of work permit, language skills), region (town/village
and labour office in charge), subjective valuations of placement officer (qualifications, chances to
find job), sanctions imposed by the placement office; previous job and desired job (occupation,
sector, position, earnings, full- / part-time), and a short history of labour market status on a daily
basis.
Particularly the subjective valuations of the placement officers and the benefit sanctions can be
informative since they capture characteristics like motivation and personal appearance that are
usually unobservable. We are confident that after controlling for this wealth of information there
is little unobserved heterogeneity left that is systematically correlated with labour market out-
comes and programme participation.
Compared to Gerfin and Lechner (2000) there is one important extension to the data. We now
have social security data for the years 1998 and 1999 which allows us to construct additional out-
come variables. In the previous study the most important outcome variable used to measure the16
effects of the programme was leaving unemployment towards employment as recorded in the un-
employment registrar. Now, we are able to measure employment by the entries in the social secu-
rity data. Hence, we can also form variables measuring the quality of employment in terms of
earnings and to some extend job duration. This allows us to address the question whether specific
programmes, subsidised temporary jobs in particular, lead to employment that may be of lower
"quality" than the employment prior to the current unemployment spell. Furthermore, we can also
evaluate the effects on earnings per se. Given the new data we can now evaluate the effects up to
24 months after the programmes start. More details on the data can be found in Appendix A and
in Gerfin and Lechner (2000).
4.2 The definition of programmes used in the empirical analysis
We differentiate only four groups of ALMP participation statuses to which we allocate all ob-
servations in our data. Because we are not interested in courses per se we aggregated the 16 dif-
ferent training courses into one broad group. Employment programmes are not differentiated ac-
cording to whether they are offered by public or private institutions as in Gerfin and Lechner
(2000), because our earlier study found no systematic differences of the effects of these two
similar forms of employment programmes. The third programme category covers participants in
subsidised temporary jobs, and the final (comparison) group consists of those who did not par-
ticipate in any major programme between January and December 1998.
10 A major programme is
defined as having a duration of at least two weeks. Following the arguments in Gerfin and
Lechner (2000) we evaluate only the first major programme starting between January and De-
cember 1998 (see that paper for details).
11
For the group of nonparticipants important time varying variables like ’unemployment duration
prior to the programme’ are not defined. To make meaningful comparisons to those unemployed
entering a programme, we use an approach suggested in Lechner (2002b): For each nonpartici-
pant a hypothetical programme starting date is predicted by relevant information available in
Dec, 1997. Persons with predicted starting date later than their actual exit date from unemploy-
ment are excluded from the data set.
                                                          
10 The reason not to consider programmes starting before 1998 is that the data does not contain sufficient
information on the type and the duration of programmes prior to 1998. Comprehensive coverage of labour market
programmes in the official statistics was only introduced in 1998.
11 In practice this approach is less restrictive than it appears. Only about 30% of all participants enter a second
programme, and the majority of these successive programs are of the same type as the first programme.17
4.3 The sample
We apply a series of sample selection rules to the data. Full details are given in Appendix A.1.
The most important selection criteria are that we consider only individuals unemployed on Dec
31, 1997 with an unemployment spell at that time of less than 12 months who have not partici-
pated in any major programme in 1997 and who are between 25 and 55 years old. The reasons for
these selection criteria are that given the two-year entitlement period we want to make sure that
there is sufficient time left to participate in a programme after December 31, 1997. Furthermore,
given our focus on the first programme we exclude those who participated in a major programme
before 1998. In addition given the variety of options for the young (schooling) and the older un-
employed (early retirement) we exclude them from our analysis. The final data set has 18’668
observations. Table 1 displays selected descriptive statistics of some important variables differ-
entiated by programme status.
12 For more descriptive statistics the interested reader is referred to
Table A.3 in Appendix A.
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The descriptive statistics in Table 1 conform with our expectations. The participants in employ-
ment programmes are clearly the least skilled, measured by the chances to find a job, qualifica-
tion, and previous earnings. For the other three programmes there are hardly any differences in
the skills of the participants, with the exception of the chances to find a job which are favourable
                                                          
12  Compared to Gerfin and Lechner (2000) the number of participants in TEMP is larger. This is due to a change in
the definition of a major programme in the case of TEMP. In the earlier study the proportion of the time spent in
TEMP relative to the month was set to 66% in order to be counted as a month in TEMP; In this study we reduced
this threshold to 50%.18
for the participants of the subsidised temporary job programme. Unemployment spell duration at
the time of programme start is three or four months larger for participants in employment pro-
grammes reflecting case workers’ tendency to send unemployed to these programmes when no
other programme seems to be adequate. Earnings in December 1999 are almost identical for non-
participants and participants in courses and temporary wage subsidies, but lower for participants
in employment programmes. Somewhat surprisingly is the relatively high employment share of
participants in EP, which is higher than for nonparticipants. Of course, these figures for the out-
come variables cannot be interpreted as the causal effects of the programmes.
5 Different participants in the two subsidised temporary employ-
ment programmes
Our main interest is the comparison of employment programmes and subsidised temporary jobs.
Therefore, we focus on the determinants of this particular selection in this section. We are inter-
ested how the results conform with our expectations derived from the above discussions. Table 2
displays the estimation results of a binary probit for the choice between employment programme
and subsidised temporary jobs, estimated on the subsample of participants in either programme.
The results for the multinomial probit estimation on the full sample can be found in Appendix B.
Our previous arguments are based on two central attributes: skill level and unemployment dura-
tion. For both we find the expected selection into the programmes. The unskilled, measured by a
low previous job position, low chances to find a job and low monthly earnings before unem-
ployment, have a significantly larger probability to enter employment programmes. The prob-
ability to get a subsidised temporary job is significantly higher when the unemployment spell
duration is short. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that there is a limited supply of tem-
porary jobs. The unskilled may have problems finding them and after some time the case workers
allocate them to employment programmes.
There is an obvious heterogeneity in the selection process according to the previous occupation.
There is also strong regional heterogeneity in the selection process. Due to the federal structure of
Swiss policy making, the cantons have a considerable degree of autonomy and put different em-
phasis on the various programmes in their local implementation of the national ALMP.19
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Another interesting question with respect to unemployment duration is the timing in the selection
into nonparticipants and temporary jobs. We have argued that it may be preferable not to accept a
temporary job while unemployment duration is short. Subsidised temporary jobs are usually be-
low the skills of the unemployed, and having a temporary job too early may be a negative signal,
particularly for skilled unemployed. Indeed we find that for short unemployment durations the20
probability of Subsidised temporary jobs is significantly lower compared to nonparticipation (see
Appendix B, Table B.1). The results concerning skills are not as clear cut. When measuring skills
by previous position (management etc), qualification, and previous earnings (above CHF 5000)
the results correspond to our expectation that highly skilled unemployed have higher probabilities
of nonparticipation in any programme. But measuring skills by chances to find a job indicates a
higher probability of nonparticipation for the unemployed with low chances to find a job.
6 Econometrics
The prototypical model of the microeconometric evaluation literature with multiple treatments is
the following: An individual chooses between several states, like participation in a training pro-
gramme or non-participation in such a programme. The potential participant in a programme will
get an hypothetical outcome (e.g. earnings) in both states. This model is based on the binary
potential outcome (the Roy (1951) - Rubin (1974) model) extended by Imbens (2000) and
Lechner (2001) to multiple, mutually exclusive states. Here, we consider outcomes of four differ-
ent states denoted by 
0123 {,,,} YYYY . The different states will to be called treatments in the fol-
lowing to stick to the terminology of that literature. For any individual, only one component of
0123 {,,,} YYYY  is observable. Participation in a particular treatment m is indicated by the realisa-
tion of the random variable S, {0,1,2,3} S Î . This notation allows us (under the usual assumptions,
see Rubin 1974) to define average treatment effects for pair-wise comparisons of the effects of
different states:
g 0
ml m l m l EY Y E Y E Y
, () =- = - ;( 1 )
q 0
ml m l m l E Y YS m E Y S m E YS m
, (| ) ( | ) ( | ) =- = = = - = .( 2 )
g 0
ml ,  denotes the expected (average) effect of treatment m relative to treatment l for a participant
drawn randomly from the population.
13 Note that both average treatment effects are symmetric in
the sense that g 0
ml ,  = -g 0
lm , . q 0
ml ,  is the expected effect for an individual randomly drawn from the
population of participants in treatment m only. Note that if the participants in treatments m and l21
differ in a way that is related to the distribution of X, and if the treatment effects vary with X, then
q 0
ml ,   -q 0
lm , , i.e. the treatment effects on the treated are not symmetric.
6.2 Identification
The average causal treatment effect is generally not identified so that additional (plausible) as-
sumptions are needed. We already made clear above that the data is so rich, that it seems plausi-
ble that we can observe all important factors that jointly influence labour market outcomes and
the process selecting people into the four different states.
14 Therefore, we assume that treatment
participation and treatment outcome is independent conditional on a set of (observable) attributes
(conditional independence assumption, CIA). Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) consider identi-
fication under CIA in the model with multiple treatments. CIA defined to be valid in a subspace
c of the attribute space is formalised in expression (3):
YY Y S X x x
M 01 ,, . . . , | , C =" ³ c.( 3 )
This assumption requires the researcher to observe all characteristics that jointly influence the
outcomes as well as the selection into the treatments. In addition it is required that all individuals
in that subspace could participate in all states (i.e. 0( | ) PS m X x <= = ,  0,...,3 m "= ,  x c "Î ).
Equation (3) postulates that conditional on the observable attributes there remains no systematic
selection on unobservables. In other word there are no exogenous variables left out that are both
correlated with potential outcomes and the participation decision. What would be such candidates
causing selection bias in our application? Candidates for these unobservables include variables
like motivation, ability and personal appearance. We believe that our unusually informative data
allows us to capture the effects of these unobservables. For example, motivation can be measured
by sanctions imposed by the placement office as well as by the employment history in the past
ten years. Unobserved ability is captured by past earnings, and specific labour-related problems
can be measured by past employment profiles (repeated movement between labour market
states). Of particular importance is the variable “chances to find a job”, which is a subjective
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13  If a variable Z cannot be changed by the effect of the treatment then all what follows is also valid in strata of the
data defined by different values of Z.22
judgement by the placement officer. This judgement is based on interviews and the impressions
the placement officer receives through these interviews. We believe that this variable captures
characteristics like motivation and personal appearance that are usually unobservable. We are
confident that after controlling for this wealth of information there is little unobserved heteroge-
neity left that is systematically correlated with labour market outcomes and programme partici-
pation. For detailed arguments about identification the reader is referred to Gerfin and Lechner
(2000).
6.3 A matching estimator
Lechner (2001) shows that CIA identifies all effects defined in this section and that expression
(3) implies independence not only conditional on X but also on the marginal probabilities of the
states conditional on X, denoted by 
0123 [ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )] PXPXPXPX.
15 Based on this insight
Lechner (2001, 2002a, b) proposes and applies different matching estimators for that problem.
Here we use the version implemented in the paper by Gerfin and Lechner (2000). The exact
matching algorithm used is given in Table 3.
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 Here we use the same setting as in Gerfin and Lechner (2000), but with an extended sample. In Gerfin and
Lechner (2000) we argue extensively that CIA is plausible in our setting. For reasons of brevity we refer the
interested reader to that paper.
15 In fact depending on the effect to be estimated we need to condition only on a subset or of functions of these
probabilities. For all details the reader is referred to Lechner (2000).23
Table 3: A matching protocol for the estimation of 
,
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Several comments are in order. A discussion of the implementation as well as the results of the
simulated maximum likelihood estimator of the multinomial probit model used in Step 1 is given
in Appendix B.
Step 2 ensures that we estimate only effects in regions of the attribute space where two observa-
tions from two treatments could be observed having a similar participation probability.
16 Other-
wise the estimator will give biased results (see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, Todd, 1998). In total
the common step criteria discarded only about 3.5% of the observations (see Appendix C for de-
tails).
As a third remark with respect to the matching algorithm outlined in Table 3 concerns the fact
that the same comparison observation is used repeatedly in forming the comparison group
(matching with replacement). This modification of the ’standard’ estimator (which means in-
creasing the variance by reducing the bias) is necessary for the estimator to be applicable at all
when the number of participants in treatment m is larger than in the comparison treatment l. Since
                                                          
16 This condition is also called the ’common-support requirement’. Note that if we would only be interested in pair-
wise effects the current implementation would be unnecessarily strict, since making sure that there is an overlap
for each pair would be sufficient. Our implementation has the advantage that we evaluate all programmes on the
same support.24
the role of m and l could be reversed in this framework, this is always the case when the number
of participants is not equal in all treatments. For the sake of brevity we do not document the
matching quality explicitly. Similarly to the already mentioned previous studies this estimator
roughly balances the covariates in an appropriate way.
7 Empirical estimates of the effects
7.1 Measurement of the outcomes in the labour market
According to Swiss legislation the primary objective of the active labour market policy is to in-
crease the reemployment probabilities. At least implicitly, the idea is also that the new job should
be at least of similar quality as the previous one. We combine the two data sources available to
develop indicators that proxy these objectives. One outcome variable (seeking a job) is based on
the information whether somebody is registered with the labour office as job seeker. The problem
with this otherwise ’natural’ outcome variable is that subsidised temporary jobs can increase the
maximum duration of receipt of unemployment benefits. Thus the incentive to remain registered
with the labour office is larger compared to other programmes, which do not affect the two-year
eligibility period.
17 Therefore, we compute a more reliable outcome variable called employed
from the social security data by using information whether there are payments from employment
that can be related to a particular month. In addition we create a couple of variables that measure
the quality of employment by various means (employment for at least 3 months, monthly earn-
ings larger than CHF 3000, earnings larger than cost of living given the number of dependent
member in the household and region, earnings at least 90% of earnings in the previous job). The
employment indicators including earnings information all impose that employment has a mini-
mum duration of 3 months. Furthermore, as a crude proxy for productivity that is available to the
economy, we include gross earnings from employment, coded as zero when an individual is not
employed. Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A describe the outcome variables more precisely and
show some descriptive results.
We start to measure the effects of a programme in the month after the programme started (with
simulated beginning dates for nonparticipants, see Section 4.b). In case an individual is informed
                                                          
17  However, insured earnings drop to the lower level determined by the earnings received in the temporary jobs.25
about having to attend a programme prior to the month of the actual start we use this month as
start date, because it seems plausible that a programme already has an effect on individual be-
haviour when an individual knows that she will participate. Furthermore, focusing on the begin of
the programme rules out that programmes appear to be successful, because they keep their par-
ticipants busy by making them stay in the programme. We consider a programme to be most suc-
cessful if everybody would leave it for employment (of ’good’ quality) immediately after it
started.
For programmes starting in January 1998 we measure outcome variables for 23 months (2/1998-
12/1999). However, since the evaluated programmes may start between Jan. 1998 and Dec. 1998,
only 12 months are observable for everybody. However, a large share of the programmes started
in the first quarter of 1998, so for most observations we measure the effects for at least 18
months. When interpreting the result we should also keep in mind that the economy came out of
the 1997 recession fairly quickly in 1998 and particularly in 1999 with the economy wide unem-
ployment rate falling from 5.0% in December 1997 (share of unemployment spells longer than 1
year: 33%) to 2.5% in December 1999 (share of unemployment spells longer than 1 year: 21%).
7.2 Mean effects of programmes for their participants
Table 4 shows the mean of the outcomes in the various groups, the estimated counterfactual ex-
pectations as well as pair-wise comparisons between the subsidy programmes as well as the pro-
grammes and nonparticipation. For the sake of brevity COURSES are omitted from this table be-
cause their effects are not central to this paper. Furthermore, in the table we concentrate on only
two outcome variables:, employment during at least 3 consecutive months generating on average
more than 90% of previous monthly earnings (a proxy for a somewhat stable job not much infe-
rior to the job before unemployment); and average monthly earnings. For these outcomes we pre-
sent results 3, 9, 15 and 21 months after the begin of the programme. Column (3) and (4) give the
exact sample sizes (after imposing common support) available at each point of (process) time.
Note that sample sizes fall after month 12 (the last month observed is month 24, programme par-
ticipation starts between month 1 and 12). Thus, the population changes somewhat after month
12 in the sense that, for example, the estimate for month 23 is entirely based on individuals en-
tering the programme in January 1998. Therefore, the precision of the estimates falls as well,
which is reflected in the estimated standard errors increasing after month 12.26
Columns (5) and (8) show the mean outcome for the participants in programme one (5) as well as
the mean outcomes for participants in programme zero (8). Column (6) shows the estimated mean
counterfactual outcome of treatment one for population zero. Column (7) shows the respective
estimated mean counterfactual outcome of treatment zero for population one. In general, all vari-
ables are increasing because more and more of the unemployed find jobs the longer the duration
of unemployment (and only a few return to unemployment), which is not surprising given the
economic upswing during 1998 and 1999. Nevertheless the pattern of the increase varies consid-
erably between different treatments and different populations. The variation in earnings (coded as
zero if the individual is not employed in the first labour market) is largely driven by the variation
in employment status.
The comparison of column (5) to column (6) and column (8) to column (7) reveals the magnitude
of the selection bias corrected by the estimation procedure. These comparisons confirm that the
unemployed in the employment programmes have the worst labour market perspective in all po-
tential states. From these estimates the estimated mean effects of two different states for partici-
pants in treatment 1 and 0 can be directly deduced. These estimates and the corresponding as-
ymptotic standard errors are given in columns (9) to (12). Columns (13) and (14) show the effects
for the joint population of participants (TEMP, EP, courses) and the nonparticipants. When bold,
effects are significant at the 1% level, when in italics they are significant at the 5% level.27
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The estimated effects confirm the previous findings in Gerfin and Lechner (2000) that TEMP is
the superior programme. About 15 months after the begin of the programme we find a more or
less stable and significant positive employment effect of participating in TEMP of about plus 6%-
points compared to EP and NONP. There does not appear to be too much variation of this effect
between different populations defined by treatment status. Similarly, there is an average earnings
gain after 15 months of about 300 CHF. The comparison of both programmes to nonparticipation
reveals a particular shape: negative effects appear in the beginning that eventually get positive28
and significant. In the medium run it seems that both programmes increase the employment prob-
abilities for their participants by about 6 % points. However, even for the population of partici-
pants in employment programmes it would have been more beneficial to enter TEMP instead.
Before returning to the dynamic shape of the effects in more detail, it is instructive to get an idea
about the magnitude of earnings. If we assume that those not working would receive the mean
earnings of those working, we are able to compute counterfactual earnings for the employed in all
states. Earnings computed that way (Table 5) indicate that the mean earnings level is roughly
CHF 5000. However, these numbers have to be interpreted with care because the assumption
used to compute them is not very convincing: there may be considerable selection going on (of
another type that the one already corrected for) due to different groups of unemployment entering
employment at different times for different treatments. Furthermore, the estimates may be unreli-
able particularly for the smaller samples in the second year because dividing one estimated quan-
tity by an another small estimated quantity (between 0 and 1) may result in estimates that are not
precise enough.
Table 5: Average potential earnings for those who are employed
3RWHQWLDORXWFRPH 7(03 7(03 7(03 (3 (3 (3 1213 1213 1213






        
($51          
LQ          
&+)          
         
1RWH (VWLPDWHGPHDQHDUQLQJVGLYLGHGE\HVWLPDWHGHPSOR\PHQWSUREDELOLW\
Although Table 4 already indicated the time shape of the effects, the following figures summarise
the dynamics of the effects by showing their development over time after the start of the pro-
gramme on a monthly base (if significant at the 5% level). Note again that the sample sizes de-
crease after 12 months. The sample is probably large enough to estimate the effects for about 21
months after the start of a programme with sufficient precision.
Figures 1 and Figures 2 display the estimates of the effects of TEMP (compared to the other
states) for participants in TEMP (Figure 1) as well as the effects of EP for the participants in EP29
(Figure 2) for six different outcome variables. A line above zero indicates that TEMP has a posi-
tive employment effect relative to the programme associated with that particular line. Only ef-
fects significant at the 5% level are displayed. Note that the results are not symmetric across these
figures because the population for which the effect is defined differs.
First consider the effects of TEMP for TEMP participants (Figure 1) for the various outcome
variables. The share of unemployed finding a job with a duration of at least three months reveals
that TEMP dominates the two other programmes. In the beginning the effect is even above 10%-
points but declines subsequently and stabilises around 5 to 7% points after 15 months. This shape
may be related to difference in the duration of the programmes. As expected there is an initial
negative effect compared to nonparticipation but it disappears after about half a year and be-
comes significantly positive after 9 months. Again the effect seems to stabilise at a difference in
employment rates of about 5 to 7% points.
An alternative outcome measure called searching for a job (and registered with the labour office)
does reveal the same dynamic patterns but appears to draw a much more negative picture in the
sense that TEMP does not dominate any of the other programmes after 16 months and is always
dominated by nonparticipation. We conjecture that is because of particular feature of the Swiss
unemployment insurance system already mentioned: Participation in TEMP increases the enti-
tlement period for unemployment benefits. Therefore, this variable is not an appropriate measure
for the success of the programmes in the labour market, at least with respect to TEMP. However,
this result indicates that TEMP has an unwanted effect generated by the possibility to prolong the
entitlement period.
The dynamics in the earnings variable more or less mirror the dynamics in the employment vari-
able. The remaining three variables combine earnings and employment information. The continu-
ous increase of the effects of TEMP measured by the indicator earnings without employment loss
strongly suggests that the quality of jobs generated by TEMP is not worse than for any other pro-
gramme. Combined with the result for the outcome seeking a Job these findings suggest that par-
ticipants in TEMP fall into to groups: those who find stable employment and those who remain
unemployed and probably continue to participate in TEMP. For this latter group there is the pos-
sibility of a TEMP career, but given that unemployment benefits fall at least every second year
this cannot be a sustainable strategy to follow. At the moment the data do not allow to analyse
this possibility. From a policy perspective it is an important finding that a programme subsidising30
below qualification jobs does not necessarily lead to unemployed subsequently searching and
accepting low quality jobs.
Finally, when considering the two outcome variables that take only jobs into account that pay
either more than CHF 3000 or a pay above some level of earnings necessary to cover basic needs
(depending on location, family size, etc.), the results for the employment variable are confirmed
to a large extent.
18 In conclusion, the results strongly suggest that from the point of view of its
participants TEMP is on average highly successful in improving their position in the labour mar-
ket.
                                                          
18  The level of CHF 3000 is motivated by a debate about minimum wages in Switzerland.31
Figure 1: Dynamics of average effects for participants in TEMP compared to EP, COURSES,
























Fig. 1a: Employment with duration > 3 months
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Fig. 1c: Earnings in employment > 3 months
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Fig. 1e: Earnings > CHF 3000
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The previous comparison between EP and TEMP for TEMP participants seems also to be con-
firmed when considering the population of participants in EP (Figure 2). One difference appears
to be that in the medium run EP may not be so harmful on average for its own participants as it
was found to be for the participants in TEMP.
An interesting feature appears with respect to the comparison of EP with NONP. It seems that at
least in the longer run there is some evidence for a positive effect of EP after about a year. Al-
though these effects are not significant all the time, the fact that some of them exist for all out-
come variables (with the exception of the variable searching for a job) does indicate that EP may
have some positive medium run effect compared to nonparticipation. Another feature when com-
paring EP to nonparticipation is that there is a positive effect of EP in the very first months of the
programme. Informal interviews we conducted with various representatives of the labour offices
suggest that this effect may be due to the threat of having to ’work’ in EP instead of just receiving
unemployment benefits (remember that the start of the programme is coded as the month in
which the individual gets notified about compulsory participation in the respective programme).
This threat may lead some unemployed to deregister as well as to increased job search in order to
avoid actual participation in the programme.33
Figure 2: Dynamics of average effects for participants in EP compared to EP, COURSES, and























Fig. 2a: Employment with duration > 3 months
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Fig. 2c: Earnings in employment > 3 months
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Fig. 2e: Earnings > CHF 3000
0RQWKVDIWHUVWDUW
Fig. 2f: Earnings above equivalence earnings
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In summary, the results presented above confirm that on average TEMP is superior to the other
programmes as well as to nonparticipation. This finding already appeared in Gerfin and Lechner
(2000) to some extent, but they could not take into account any earnings information, and they
had to rely on a time horizon of no more than 15 months. However, this average analysis does not
give any answers to the question why TEMP might work better than EP. Therefore, the following
section compares effects across subgroups of unemployed.
7.3 Heterogeneity of the effects
In Section 3 we developed a number of hypotheses about effect heterogeneity. The empirical
evaluation of these hypotheses may indicate some answers to the question why TEMP is supe-
rior. The hypotheses are based on the assumption that any human capital generated by the pro-
grammes is a replacement of lost human capital due to ongoing unemployment.
19
Heterogeneity with respect to unemployment duration
One implication of this assumption is that the effects of both programmes (compared to nonpar-
ticipation) should be larger for individuals whose unemployment spell is already fairly long when
they enter the programme. Therefore, Figure 3 shows the effects of TEMP and EP for unem-
ployed with less than 180 days of unemployment before entering the programmes (upper panel)
as well as for unemployed with more than 270 days of unemployment. The results are compatible
with our hypothesis in the sense that the effects of both programmes compared to nonpar-
ticipation are significantly larger for the subpopulation with longer previous unemployment.
20
Furthermore, observing a positive effect of TEMP compared to EP for those who enter the pro-
grammes early is exactly what is expected under the signalling explanation, given the assumption
that for these unemployed the programmes do not generate human capital. On the other hand, the
fact that relatively large negative effects of employment programmes appear compared to NONP
for the short-term unemployed might indeed point to significant stigma effects. However, it could
                                                          
19 As already noted we also implicitly assume that the effects of lost job offers and of stopping the depreciation of
human capital while in the programme more or less cancels.
20  All effects presented in this subsection are based on average treatment effects, because the theory suggest that the
results should hold for the same populations. Conditioning in addition on treatment status might in fact invalidate
the comparisons. Note also that the identity 
1,2 1,0 2,0 ggg =- must hold.35
also be that the loss of time for job search in EP compared to NONP is not made up by a positive
signal or a positive human capital effect.
Figure 3: Dynamics of average effects (ATE) for employment without earnings loss – UE
duration
Compared to TEMP Compared to EP

















































Heterogeneity with respect to qualification
In Section 3 we argued that (relatively) skilled unemployed should not enter either temporary
employment programme because they are overqualified for the typical job in any of these pro-
grammes. Hence for these unemployed we should not find positive effects of the programmes36
with respect to nonparticipation. Probably the best summary measures of human capital available
in our data are previous earnings and the chances to find a job. It turns out that there are hardly
any differences between the results based on these two measures. Hence, we concentrate on skill
measured by the chance to find a job which is shown in Figure 4.
21 The upper panel refers to the
skilled unemployed. The results with respect to nonparticipation strongly support our hypothesis.
There is no effect with respect to nonparticipation for either programme (except a negative effect
for EP for some months), but also no effect between the two programmes of interest. For low
skill unemployed (lower panel in Figure 4) a completely different picture arises for the compari-
son of TEMP with nonparticipation. For these unemployed finding a subsidised temporary job is
better than nonparticipation almost throughout the evaluation period. On the other end, participa-
tion in EP does not increase employment chances (nor does it decrease them).
Summarising, the results of this section appear to support our hypotheses about the effects of the
programmes with respect to unemployment duration and skill level of the unemployed.
                                                          
21  The figures for effect heterogeneity by previous earnings are available on request.37
Figure 4: Dynamics of average effects (ATE) for employment without earnings loss – Employ-
ability
Compared to TEMP Compared to EP

















































Appendix D contains further investigations into subgroup heterogeneity. We find that separating
the sample along the line of sectors (of previous occupation) with high and low TEMP participa-
tion probabilities does not reveal any effect heterogeneity. The same holds true for effect heter-
ogeneity between women and men. Finally, considering effect heterogeneity between skilled
(50% of the unemployed) and low skilled does not reveal major differences. However, the latter
result probably merely reflect that this measure of skill level (unskilled, semiskilled, skilled) is
too crude. This suspicion already appeared for the estimation of the participation probabilities. In
these estimations the skill level is not significant (see Section 5 and Appendix B).38
8 Conclusion
Subsidised employment is one tool of active labour market policies to improve the chances of
the unemployed to find permanent employment. Using large and informative individual data
coming from various administrative sources we investigate the effects of two different schemes
of subsidised temporary employment in Switzerland. Concentrating on one country allows us to
hold constant the economic environment. The crucial difference between the two schemes is that
one operates as a non-profit employment programme, whereas the other one is a subsidy for tem-
porary jobs in firms operating in a competitive market. We are interested in how successful these
programme are in speeding up the reintegration of the unemployed into work.
We find that from the point of view of the unemployed the subsidies for temporary jobs in ’nor-
mal’ firms subject to market pressure (TEMP) are superior to the ’classical’ employment pro-
grammes (EP) operating in areas without much private competition. The effects are particularly
strong for those who might be characterised as ’bad risks’ in the labour market. About a year and
a half after the begin of the programme, on average TEMP generates additional employment for
the unemployed of about 9%-points for its participants compared to EP. Even for the participants
in EP, TEMP would have generated on average of about 6%-points additional employment if
they had participated in TEMP instead of EP. Although on average the gains generated by the
programmes (if any) compared to nonparticipation (NONP) are tiny, we find large gains com-
pared to NONP for the long term unemployed (TEMP: + 13%; EP: + 8%). Combining all evi-
dence for different groups of unemployed we generally find the programmes much less success-
ful (if at all) for unemployed that may be characterised as the ’good-risks’, whereas they tend to
increase the reemployment probabilities of ’bad risks’. However, in almost all cases TEMP is
more effective than EP. Finally, we also dismiss any concerns that the gains in the chances to
find a job are due to ’low-quality’ jobs taken up by TEMP participants.
While searching for possible explanations for our findings, the fairly systematic heterogeneity of
effects between different groups of unemployed let us conclude that there is some evidence for
positive signalling effects of TEMP (based on the results for the short-term unemployed). Fur-
thermore, there is also evidence for positive human capital effects for both EP and TEMP (based
on the results for low-skill unemployed), but again this effect appears to be much stronger for
TEMP. However, the reader should be aware that the evidence in favour or against one or the
other competing hypothesis is not based on strict tests, but is rather based on compatibility of the39
estimated effect heterogeneity with our knowledge about programme allocation processes as well
as theoretic economic considerations about possible effects.
One obvious policy conclusion is that sending people who have good chances on the labour any-
way in these programmes is probably a waste of money. Furthermore, it also appears to be a bad
idea of using these subsidy programmes in the beginning of an unemployment spell. However,
even for these groups TEMP seems to be superior to EP. In fact we find no subpopulations for
which EP is superior to TEMP. Finally, the unemployment insurance legislation requires that
cantons fulfil a regional quota of programme places they have to supply (of which EP is a part,
but not TEMP). Failure to meet this requirement would have financial consequences for the can-
tons by reducing federal payments to the cantonal unemployment office. This may have had
fairly counterproductive effects, especially given the recovery of the labour market that lead to a
diminished pool of unemployed that had to be allocated to the various programmes of the ALMP.
However, all these conclusion have to be taken with some caution, because they focus on the
unemployed, and thus ignore that there are indirect costs of both schemes. The more immediate
costs concern alternative uses of Swiss taxpayers’ money:
22 In this respect, TEMP is apparently
cheaper for the budget and thus again preferable. However, there are concerns that programmes
like TEMP may lead to substitution of unsubsidised labour through subsidised labour, i.e. they
may create unemployment. We cannot address this question with our data, but it seems unlikely
that this effect is large for a temporary programme like TEMP. The set-up of the employment
programmes should prevent crowding out unsubsidised firms. Again, we cannot deal with this
problem with our data. Obviously, future research should be directed at this issue. Furthermore,
again extending the sample in the future would allow to dig dipper into the issue of effect hetero-
geneity without having to rely on extrapolations coming from parametric functional assumptions
on the outcome equation.
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Appendix A: Data
The population of interest are prime age individuals who are registered as unemployed in De-
cember 31, 1997 and have some previous work experience. For these individuals we use the fol-
lowing data bases of the unemployment insurance system:
  AVAM database: data generated in the regional placement offices;
personal characteristics, information about last job, duration of job search, ...
  ASAL database: data from the unemployment benefit payment system;
all payments and information about programme participation.
For a randomly chosen subsample (30’433 observations; about 20% of the population of interest)
we have social security data with earnings based monthly information over the past 10 years.
This appendix explains the selection rules for the sample used (Table A.1), gives the definition of
the outcome variables (Table A.2), and presents descriptive statistics of explanatory (Table A.4)
as well as outcome variables (Table A.3 and Figure A.1). More detailed information about the
data sources are available in Gerfin and Lechner (2000).42
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Appendix B Estimates of the multinomial probit model
Table B.1 shows the estimation results of a multinomial probit model (MNP) using simulated
maximum likelihood with the GHK simulator.
23 Although being fully parametric, the MNP is a
                                                          
23  See for example Börsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou (1993) and Geweke, Keane and Runkle (1994).47
flexible version of a discrete choice model, because it does not require the Independence of Ir-
relevant Alternatives assumption to hold.
The variables that are used in the MNP are selected by a preliminary specification search based
on binary probits (each relative to the reference category SUBSIDISED TEMPORARY JOB) and score
tests against omitted variables. Entries for variables excluded from a particular choice equation
show a 0 for the coefficient and ’-’ for the standard error. The final specification contains a vary-
ing number of mainly discrete variables that cover groups of attributes related to personal char-
acteristics, valuations of individual skill and chances on the labour market as assessed by the
placement office, previous and desired future occupations, and information related to the current
and previous unemployment spell, and past employment and earnings.
In practice, some restrictions on the covariance matrix of the errors terms of the MNP need to be
imposed, because not all elements of the covariance matrix are identified and to avoid excessive
numerical instability. Guided by considerations of similarity of options and sample size, we al-
lowed for free correlations between SUBSIDISED TEMPORARY JOB and the other three alternatives
(for details see Table B.1).48
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